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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the progress of ASEAN+3 financial markets 
integration after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Adopting a Gregory 
and Hansen (1996) cointegration test that takes into account structural 
break of the series, this study finds no significant improvement in the 
intraregional financial market integration after the crisis. This may 
imply that measures that were introduced and implemented in the 
aftermath of the 1997 crisis may have not effectively affect the region’s 
financial market integration. Several factors attribute to this including 
the differences in the ASEAN+3’s institutional and legal frameworks.
Keywords: East Asia, Financial Market Integration, Cointegration, 
Regional Institutions
INTRODUCTION
The 1997 crisis initiated a regular series of meetings at the cabinet and head-of-
governments level among ASEAN countries and their counterparts from China, 
Korea and Japan, which altogether known as ASEAN+3.  The meetings have 
dealt with issues regarding the financial crisis, its aftermath and the ongoing 
efforts to support regional economic integration.  The region agrees that one 
way to counter the impact of the crisis and to prevent recurrence of crisis is by 
enhancing the region’s financial market integration.  Several measures have been 
put forward including two major frameworks - Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and 
Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI).  CMI aims to create a network of bilateral 
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swap arrangements among ASEAN+3 countries that enables them to borrow 
predetermined amounts of their counterparts’ reserves to supplement their own in 
order to address short-term liquidity difficulties.  ABMI was established to develop 
efficient and liquid bond markets in Asia that allows better utilization of Asian 
savings for Asian investments.  However, to the best of our knowledge, there is 
no study has examined the progress of financial market integration in ASEAN+3 
since the incident of the 1997 financial crisis.
The objective of this study is to assess the improvement of ASEAN+3’s 
financial market integration after the 1997 financial crisis.  We employ the Gregory 
and Hansen (1996) residual based test to determine the level of the cointegration in 
the region’s financial market which is represented by the stock and the credit market. 
This technique takes into account the presence of structural break in the series that 
could bias the cointegration test results.  Although cointegration techniques has 
been used in several studies of East Asian economic integration (Click & Plummer, 
2005; Yang, Kolari & Min, 2003), none of them has taken into account the issue 
of structural break.  Identifying structural breaks in economic data is important 
because the existence of structural breaks in a series can affect the series’ stationary 
properties and distort any long-run trends inherent in the series (Perron, 1989).
Several cointegration tests that allow a presence of structural break in a series 
have been introduced.  One of them is by sub-sampling either side of the structural 
break that require sampling break pre-judgment.  This procedure has been criticized 
because the breaking point is determined subjectively exposing to personal bias.  In 
response to this, several methods of cointegration test that endogenously determine 
the break point have been developed.  One of them is the Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
residual-based test that can accommodate a structural change in the underlying 
series and their cointegrating relationships.
The results of this study show that both regional credit market and stock 
market have yet to reach full integration in both pre and post crisis periods.  We 
also do not find a significant improvement in the integration of the regional credit 
and stock markets between the two periods.  This chapter also suggests that low 
financial market integration in the region could be due to several reasons including 
differences in the ASEAN+3’s institutional and legal frameworks.
LITERATURE REVIEW
East Asian financial market has recorded a rapid growth in their international capital 
mobility following the region’s financial market liberalization in the early 1990s. 
However, the progress of the intraregional financial integration is increasing at a 
slow pace as most of the financial market integration in the region occurred more 
on a global basis (Park, 2002).  The level of regional cross border bank credit flow 
is low while the development of an integrated market in government and corporate 
bonds is stagnant.  The regional equity market also shows no sign of consolidation. 
186
International Journal of Economics and Management
Poonpatpibul, Tanboon and Leelapornchai (2006) state that there are three aspects 
that show East Asia is more integrated with the developed markets rather than 
as a regional market.  First, financial openness in East Asia still lags behind the 
developed markets despite its rising level.  Second, bank lending and cross-country 
portfolio investment in East Asia is still significantly lower than that of the European 
Union counterpart.  Third, East Asian overnight interbank interest rate is declining 
although the rate is still higher than that of the European Union. 
Park and Bae (2002) find that East Asia has stronger ties with advanced 
countries such as the US and Western Europe than with one another.  This finding 
is also supported by Jeon, Oh and Yang (2005) in a study that is based on various 
tests utilizing cross-country interest rate and stock price data, and Kim, Kim and 
Wang (2004, 2006), who estimate the degree of East Asia’s risk sharing by using 
a cross-country consumption correlation and formal regression analysis.  Bekaert 
and Harvey (1995), and Eichengreen and Park (2005) have also empirically shown 
that East Asia’s financial market is more integrated with the developed economies 
over the last decades.
However, several studies show that the intraregional financial market In East 
Asia is progressing.  Click and Plummer (2005) examine the ASEAN-5’s (five core 
ASEAN countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) 
stock markets integration using a VAR cointegration technique and utilizing four 
and half years daily and weekly data from July 1, 1998 to December 31, 2002. 
Their results suggest that the ASEAN-5’s stock markets are integrated after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis but the integration is far from complete.  Yang, Kolari 
and Min (2003) examine long run relationship and short-run dynamic linkages 
among the US, Japanese, and ten Asian emerging stock markets (Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Taiwan) to observe the changes in the level of stock market integration prior, 
during and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  Using daily data over January 2, 
1995 to May 15, 2001 and employing vector autoregression (VAR) technique of 
generalized impulse response analysis, they find that both long-run cointegrated 
relationships and short-run causal linkages among these markets were strengthened 
during the crisis.  In addition, they find that these markets have generally been more 
integrated after the crisis than before the crisis.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data
The samples of our study are taken from January 1990 to December 2005 from 
8 ASEAN+3 countries namely China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  This study uses monthly money market rate 
in measuring credit market integration and end of the month closed stock exchange 
index for the measurement of stock market integration.  Both of the series are 
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obtained from DataStream.  The data are split into two periods.  The first period is 
the period before the 1997 financial crisis and the second period is the post-crisis 
period.  In order to avoid non-homogeneity in the sample, we do not include the 
period of crisis in the estimation.  In general, the 1997 Asian crisis started in July 
1997 and most of the main macroeconomic variables were stabilized in June 1998. 
Thus, samples from period July 1997 – June 1998 are excluded in the estimation. 
Therefore, the pre crisis period for this study runs from January 1991 to June 1997 
while the post crisis period covers from July 1998 to December 2004.
Zivot and Andrews (1992) Unit Root Test
Stationarity test is a prerequisite for every cointegration test.  Many previous studies 
utilize the ADF unit root test to examine the stationary properties of the time series 
data.  However, this test does not allow for a structural break in the time series data 
which may have a significant impact on the stationary result.  Results of the test 
are likely to be biased towards not rejecting the existence of a unit root, especially 
with short time spans of data (Perron, 1989).
To account for structural changes, Perron (1989) introduced a dummy variable 
to the ADF test.  The null hypothesis of the test is a unit root with an exogenous 
structural break occurring at a particular time TB and the alternative hypothesis is that 
the series is stationary with an exogenous change in the trend at that particular time 
TB.  This procedure, however, received criticism as the exogenous determination of 
the break time can raise the risk of a wrong period selection.  Zivot and Andrews 
(1992) argue that the exogenous selection of structural break could lead to an over 
rejection of the unit root hypothesis.  They stress that inferring the break point from 
examination of data can make the conventional critical values for test of parameter 
invalid.  This is supported by Christiano (1992) who indicates that the procedure 
invalidates the distribution theory underlying conventional testing.
Zivot and Andrews (1992) develop unit root testing procedures that allow 
the existence of a possible structural break in the series, without predetermining 
the break point time.  Their procedures determine the structural break point 
endogenously without worrying the problem of selecting a break point subjectively. 
They show that the endogenous selection of break point had a major impact on the 
unit root results.  They were unable to reject the unit root hypothesis for four of the 
Nelson and Plosser (1982) series, which was rejected by Perron (1989).
This study performs a unit root test for both pre- and post-crisis money market 
rates and stock prices using Zivot and Andrews’s procedure.  There are three models 
to test for a unit root.  The first model or Model A (equation 1) allows a one-time 
change in the level of the series.  The second model or Model B (equation 2) permits 
a one time change in the slope of the trend function.  The third model or Model 
C (equation 3) combines one-time changes in the level and the slope of the trend 
function of the series.
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The equations are similar to the ADF unit root test but with an inclusion of the 
dummy terms.  DUt is an indicator dummy variable for a mean shift occurring at 
each possible break-date (TB) while DTt is the corresponding trend shift variable. 
Formally,
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To determine the number of k, this study follows the procedure used in Zivot 
and Andrews (1992) by starting backwards from a maximum lag of 12.  The 
appropriate number of lags is determined when the value of i is chosen such that 
t-statistic of θi is greater than 1.6 in absolute value, and the statistics for θi+n for n 
> 0 is less than 1.6.  The decision of unit root hypothesis rejection is determined by 
the generated critical values.  Asymptotic distributions of the minimum t-statistics 
and critical values for rejecting the null hypothesis are provided by Zivot and 
Andrews (1992).
According to Perron (1989), most time series can be sufficiently modelled either 
by Model A or Model C.  Consequently, many subsequent studies focus on these 
two models in their time series analyses.  Sen (2003) reveals that the application 
of Model A leads to a substantial power loss if in fact the break occurs in Model C. 
However, if the break occurs in Model A but Model C is used, the loss in power 
is minimal.  This suggests that Model C is superior to Model A.  Thus, this study 
focuses on Model C in the analysis of unit root.
Gregory and Hansen (1996) Cointegration Test
Gregory and Hansen (1996) extend Engle and Granger’s (1987) procedure by 
allowing a structural break in either the intercept or the intercept and the co-
integrating coefficient at an unknown time.  They propose residual based tests for 
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the null hypothesis of no co-integration with structural break against the alternative 
assumptions.  The revision of the model produced these three following simple 
specifications with two variables:
Model C: Level shift
y x0 1 1t t tn n { a ~= + + +  (6)
Model C/T: Level shift with trend
y xt t t t0 1 1n n { b a ~= + + + +  (7)
Model C/S: Regime shift
y x x1 2t t t t t0 1 1n n { a a { ~= + + + +  
(8)
Each of the models has a dummy variable φt to allow for a structural break. 
The dummy variable is defined as:
......
......
if t
otherwise
1
0
t
" (
{
x
= )  (9)
where τ denotes the structural breaking point in the series.  The value of τ is 
determined using a grid search procedure with all values in the central 80% of the 
sample being considered.  The residual ωt, produced by the model at each value of 
τ is saved and employed in the following Dickey-Fuller testing equation:
ADF* = p 1 t tT~ ~ y= - +t t^ h   (10)
The minimum value obtained for the t-statistics of (ρ-1) is declared as the 
test statistics for each model.  Gregory and Hansen have tabulated critical values 
by modifying the Mackinnon (1991) procedure.  The null hypothesis of Gregory 
and Hansen tests is that there is a unit root in the residuals and hence there is no 
cointegration while the alternative hypothesis is that there is no unit root in the 
residuals and hence there is cointegration with a single unknown break.  The null 
hypothesis is rejected if the statistic ADF* is smaller than the corresponding critical 
value.  The test statistics can also be measured using the Philip test statistics that 
are denoted as Z*α and Z*t.  These three models can be easily extended to occupy 
more than one explanatory variable.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Zivot and Andrews (1992) Unit Root Test
The results of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit root test on the money market 
rate series are presented in Table 1 while the results of stock prices series unit root 
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test are presented in Table 2.  For money market rate series in the pre-crisis period, 
the Zivot and Andrews unit root test fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root at the 5 percent significance level in four countries - Japan, Korea, Singapore 
and Thailand.  This means that the market rate series in these four countries are 
non-stationary.  In the post-crisis period, the results show that money market rates 
series are non-stationary only in the Philippines and Singapore.
Table 1 Zivot and Andrews (1992) Unit Root Test on Money Market Rates
Country
Pre Crisis Post Crisis
Lags t-statistics Break point Lags t-statistics Break period
China 2 -6.39** May 93 1 -5.11* Oct 04
Indon 2 -7.59** Jul 94 2 -5.70** Oct 04
Japan 1 -3.39 Apr 92 2 -5.25* Mar 01
Korea 1 -4.16 Oct 92 3 -6.27** Jul 01
Malaysia 2 -5.95** Jan 94 2 10.29** Oct 99
Philippines 1 -6.70** Jun 94 3 -4.05 Jan 02
Singapore 2 -3.69 Apr 93 1 -4.90 Sep 01
Thailand 1 -4.78 Jan 94 1 -8.64** Jul 03
Note: * (**) represents significant at 5 (1) percent levels.
Table 2 Zivot and Andrews (1992) Unit Root Test on Stock Prices
Country
Pre Crisis Post Crisis
Lags t-statistics Break point Lags t-statistics Break period
China 1 -3.99 May 93 1 -5.19* Jul 01
Indon 1 -3.82 Dec 95 3 -3.81 Jun 02
Japan 1 -4.09 Mar 92 1 -2.42 Apr 00
Korea 1 -3.81 Nov 93 1 -2.66 May 04
Malaysia 2 -5.20* Aug 93 1 -4.58 Jun 00
Philippines 1 -4.74 Oct 93 1 -3.24 Jun 02
Singapore 1 -4.19 Aug 93 3 -3.92 Jul 03
Thailand 1 -3.39 Dec 95 1 -4.13 Feb 00
Note: * (**) represents significant at 5 (1) percent levels.
For stock prices, in the pre-crisis period, the Zivot and Andrews unit root tests 
fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at 5 percent significance level in 
all countries except Malaysia.  This shows that all the countries’ stock prices are 
non-stationary except Malaysia.  In the post-crisis period, the test shows that all 
stock prices are non-stationary except China’s.
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The break points determined by Zivot and Andrews are not consistent between 
series.  For the money market rate, the break points in the pre-crisis period vary 
between October 1992 and July 1994, while in the post-crisis period, they vary 
between October 1999 and October 2004.  For stock prices, the break points in 
the pre-crisis period range between March 1992 and December 1995, while in the 
post-crisis period, between February 2000 and May 2004.
Gregory and Hansen (1996) Cointegration Test
The Gregory and Hansen cointegration test can only be performed on non-stationary 
series with identical order of integration, I(n).  For money market rate series, the 
Zivot and Andrews unit root test finds 4 non-stationary series in the pre-crisis 
period - Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand.  In the post-crisis period, only two 
series of the Philippines and Singapore are non-stationary.
For stock prices series, the tests find that all of the countries are non-stationary 
except Malaysia in the pre-crisis period and China in the post-crisis period.  Since 
Gregory and Hansen’s technique is a single equation model, every non-stationary 
series is used as a dependant variable one at a time while the rest of the non-
stationary series enter the model as independent variables.
This study closely follows the set up used by Gregory and Hansen.  The lag 
length K is selected on the basis of a t-test following a procedure similar to Perron 
and Vogelsang (1992).  The Kmax is set to 6 and then test downward (reducing K) 
until the last lag of the first difference included is significant at the 5 percent level 
using normal critical values.
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the Gregory and Hansen cointegration test 
on money market rate series in the pre- and post-crisis periods, respectively.
In the pre crisis period, only two countries have significant statistics Korea 
and Thailand.  Korea records significant Zt* statistics at 5 percent significance 
level in model C and C/T.  Thailand, on the other hand, registers significant ADF* 
statistics and Zt* statistics at 5 percent significance level in all three models - model 
C, model C/T and model C/S.  This results show that not all of the countries are 
significantly cointegrated with the other countries in the model.  With this and the 
fact that not every ASEAN+3 country is included in the cointegration test suggest 
that ASEAN+3’s money market rates are not fully cointegrated in the pre-crisis 
period.
In the post-crisis period, only two series are found to be non-stationary, the 
Philippines and Singapore.  The results of the Granger and Hansen cointegration 
test find that Singapore’s Zt* statistics are significant at the 5 percent significance 
level in model C and model C/S implying significant cointegration of Singapore 
to the Philippines.  However, using the Philippines as a dependant variable does 
not yield any significant Zt* statistics.  Nonetheless, the ADF* statistics in all three 
models are significant at 5 percent significance level.  This shows that there is full 
cointegration between these two countries.
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Table 3 Gregory and Hansen (1996) Cointegration Test on Money Market 
Rate (Pre-crisis)
ADF* Zt* Zα*
Japan Model C -4.32 -4.48 -31.33
Model C/T -4.32 -4.35 -31.35
Model C/S -4.76 -4.31 -29.19
Korea Model C -5.48 * -5.55 * -45.16
Model C/T -5.28 -5.73 * -49.11
Model C/S -5.39 -5.73 -48.12
Singapore Model C -4.37 -4.39 -32.65
Model C/T -5.55 -4.65 -35.44
Model C/S -4.55 -4.66 -35.90
Thailand Model C -5.49 * -5.57 * -45.87
Model C/T -5.83 * -5.91 * -49.19
Model C/S -6.35 * -6.41 * -55.36
Note: * (**) denotes significant at 5 (1) percent confidence levels.
Table 4 Gregory and Hansen (1996) Cointegration Test on Money Market 
Rate (Post-crisis)
ADF* Zt* Zα*
Philippines
Model C -5.22 ** -3.76 -25.26
Model C/T -5.23 * -4.05 -27.03
Model C/S -5.81 ** -3.92 -26.26
Singapore
Model C -4.50 -4.77 * -31.32
Model C/T -4.74 -4.70 -31.34
Model C/S -4.67 -5.00 * -31.88
Note: * (**) denotes significant at 5 (1) percent confidence levels.
The results of the Granger and Hansen test for money market rates in both 
pre- and post-crisis periods and together with the fact that not all countries are 
included in the cointegration test show that ASEAN+3’s credit markets are not 
fully cointegrated.  There is some degree of integration among some countries but 
no full integration is observed in the credit market.
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the Gregory and Hansen cointegration test 
on ASEAN+3’s stock prices in the pre- and post-crisis periods.  Malaysia and China 
are excluded in the test for the pre- and post-crisis periods, respectively, because 
their time series are found to be stationary in the Zivot and Andrew unit root test. 
Therefore, for each period, only seven countries are included in the Granger and 
Hansen cointegration test.  This means that there are six regressors for each single 
equation.  However, asymptotic critical values provided by Gregory and Hansen 
(1996) are only up to 4-regressors.  Since the aim of our study is to investigate the 
existence of full cointegration in the system, we refer our results for models that 
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have four or more regressors to the critical values of 4-regressors.  Since higher 
number of regressors has higher critical values (see Table 1 in Gregory and Hansen 
(1996)), the insignificance of a series based on 4-regressors critical value means 
that the series is also insignificant if based on critical values of higher number of 
regressors.  The existence of one insignificant statistics among the series can be 
used as an indicator of the absence of full integration in the system.
In the pre-crisis period, three countries, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, 
do not have significant cointegration test statistics of ADF*, Zt* and Zα*, in all C, 
C/T and C/S models.  The cointegration statistics in each of these countries are 
lower than the critical value of 4-regressors equation, which definitely must be 
lower than the critical values of 6-regressors equation.  Therefore, this study can 
conclude that these three series are not significantly cointegrated with the other 
countries.  Thus, there is no full cointegration in ASEAN+3’s stock markets in the 
pre-crisis period, or in the economic sense, the ASEAN+3’s stock markets are not 
fully integrated in the pre-crisis period.
Table 5 Gregory and Hansen (1996) Cointegration Test on Stock Prices  
(Pre Crisis)
ADF* Zt* Zα*
China
Model C -5.03 -5.65 -44.90 
Model C/T -5.74 -6.10 * -49.39  
Model C/S -6.31 -7.49 ** -65.35 
Indonesia
Model C -5.08 -5.12 -32.88
Model C/T -5.03 -5.21 -36.37
Model C/S -5.60 -5.62 -40.99
Japan
Model C -5.68 * -5.72 * -46.44
Model C/T -5.73 -5.77 -47.06
Model C/S -6.07 -6.20 -52.20
Korea
Model C -5.06 -5.05 -40.99
Model C/T -5.84 * -5.88 * -49.04
Model C/S -6.29 -6.47 * -54.51
Philippines
Model C -5.42 -5.87 * -44.24
Model C/T -5.02 -4.98 -36.30
Model C/S -6.05 -6.09 -48.04
Singapore
Model C -5.04 -5.05 -38.62
Model C/T -5.04 -5.05 -38.62
Model C/S -5.29 -5.73 -46.69
Thailand
Model C -5.09 -5.12 -41.98
Model C/T -5.59 -5.63 -47.51
Model C/S -5.58 -5.72 -46.82
Note: * (**) denotes significant at 5 (1) percent confidence level using 4-regressors critical value.
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In the post-crisis period, Japan has non-significant ADF*, Zt* and Zα*, in all 
C, C/T and C/S models.  Since the critical value used is for 4-regressors model, 
the results means that there is at least one country that is not cointegrated to the 
other six countries.  This implies that there is no full stock market integration in 
ASEAN+3 after the 1997 financial crisis.  This finding is parallel to Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) who examine the impact of various crisis events such as the 1997 
Asian crisis, the 1994 Mexican crisis and the 1987 US stock market crash, on 
stock market co-movement.  They find that cross-market linkages did not change 
significantly either in the pre- or post-crisis, which means that stock markets are 
significantly interdependent.
Table 6 Gregory and Hansen (1996) Cointegration Test on Stock Prices  
(Post Crisis)
ADF* Zt* Zα*
Indonesia Model C -6.41 ** -5.68 * -38.73
Model C/T -6.82 ** -5.86 * -45.79
Model C/S -7.65 ** -7.28 ** -68.68
Japan Model C -4.76 -4.67 -38.60
Model C/T -4.56 -4.21 -34.39
Model C/S -5.69 -5.67 -53.24
Korea Model C -4.26 -4.29 -34.18
Model C/T -4.70 -4.78 -37.45
Model C/S -6.95 ** -6.45 * -58.48
Malaysia Model C -6.11 ** -5.98 * -52.34
Model C/T -7.22 ** -7.26 ** -66.97 *
Model C/S -6.96 ** -7.03 ** -65.13
Philippines Model C -5.07 -5.09 -40.47
Model C/T -5.36 -5.39 -44.54
Model C/S -7.13 ** -7.25 ** -68.34
Singapore Model C -6.13 ** -6.28 ** -54.32
Model C/T -6.52 ** -6.58 ** -58.44
Model C/S -7.31 ** -7.71 ** -72.06
Thailand Model C -5.49 -5.60 * -45.70
Model C/T -6.23 * -6.29 * -53.57
Model C/S -6.73  * -6.77 * -60.37
Note: * (**) denotes significant at 5 (1) percent confidence level using 4-regressors 
critical value.
DISCUSSION
The results of the Gregory and Hansen (1996) cointegration tests suggest that both 
regional credit markets and stock markets have yet to reach full integration in both 
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pre and post crisis periods.  The use of this test does not indicate any significant 
improvement in the level of credit market and stock market integration between 
these two periods.  The results are not really a surprise although many efforts have 
been taken to foster economic relationship among the member countries. 
Several factors contribute to the low integration and the absence of full 
integration in ASEAN+3’s financial market.  First is that the process of financial 
integration in the region is only in its early stages.  The region focused more on 
trade activities in its early years of economic cooperation.  The activities on the 
financial integration have only intensified after the 1997 financial crisis.  Second is 
that the process of integration in the region is weakly institutionalized.  The process 
is a multi-polar which is not driven by an alliance of key nations unlike France 
and Germany in the Europe, or by hegemonic powers unlike the United States in 
the Western Hemisphere.  Third is the small size of financial sector in most of the 
regional countries except Japan and Singapore.  For example, the sizes of banking 
sector in the region are small which have inadequate and system and administration 
structure.  This hinders the development of regional capital markets especially in 
countries where financial systems are primarily oriented.
Other than the above three factors, the low degree of financial integration is 
also attributed by the differences in the regional institution such as the legal system, 
tax system, corporate governance and perception of corruption in the individual 
ASEAN+3 countries.
Institutional Differences
The differences of the ASEAN+3 legal and institutional frameworks can have 
an impact on the degree of the region’s financial integration.  Some of the 
institutional difference indicators used in studies of financial integration include 
the differences in legal system, tax system, corporate governance and perception 
of corruption in individual ASEAN+3 countries.  These indicators do not reflect 
the degree of financial integration but they are suggestive in explaining the sources 
of segmentation.
For institutional differences, this study uses indices constructed by Djankov 
et al. (2001) to discuss how the difference in ASEAN+3’s legal systems might 
affect the region’s financial integration.  Djankov et al. have many indices but we 
focus on a collection of bounced cheque as an indicator for legal system efficiency. 
The index of corporate governance is obtained from La Porta et al. (1998), who 
examine three aspects of ASEAN+3’s corporate governance - creditor rights, anti-
director rights and accounting standards.  Corruption perception index is obtained 
from Transparency International’s 2001 Corruption Perception Index, which was 
released in June, 2001.  For tax system, we use the main features of the corporate 
tax systems to discuss the differences of ASEAN+3’s tax system.
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The Legal System
Generally, the legal systems of ASEAN+3 countries originate from four different 
systems.  For Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, their laws are based on the 
English legal system.  The legal system in China, on the other hand, originates 
from the Socialist legal system.  The legal systems for Japan and Korea originate 
from the German legal system while Indonesia’s law originates from the French 
legal system.  Different legal systems structurally operate in different ways.  For 
example, legal systems that are based on the English laws which are known as 
the common law rely on judges, broader legal principles, and oral arguments.  On 
the other hand, the legal systems that are based on the French and German laws, 
also known as the civil law, rely on professional judges, and the legal and written 
codes.  La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that origin of legal systems is one factor that 
contributes to the differences in judicial efficiency observed across countries.  It 
is argued that common law countries are more efficient in their judicial systems 
compared to civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1998).  An efficient judicial system 
is expected to lower enforcement costs, which in turn have a positive impact on the 
availability and terms of funding to firms and households.  D’Amuri and Marenzi 
(2005) show that judicial system efficiency improves credit availability and lowers 
collateral requirements and interest rates.  Thus, differences in the origins of the 
legal systems in ASEAN+3 countries can be a potential factor in the region’s low 
financial integration.
Table 7 Regulation of Dispute Resolution Index and Expected Duration of 
the Procedure of Collection of A Bounced Cheque
Countries RDR Index Duration (days)
China 4.13 180.00
Indonesia 4.38 225.00
Japan 2.79 60.00
Korea 4.00 75.00
Malaysia 3.00 90.00
Philippines 5.50 164.00
Singapore 3.21 46.50
Thailand 3.88 210.00
ASEAN+3 mean 3.86 131.31
Socialist Law 4.13 180.00
Common Law 3.36 115.50
Civil Law 4.17 131.00
French Legal System 4.94 194.50
German Legal System 3.39 67.50
Notes: RDR refer to Regulation of Dispute Resolution
Sources: Djankov et al. (2001)
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Djankov et al. (2001) propose a regulation of dispute resolution index, which 
measures the extent of the differences between legal procedures and informal dispute 
resolution.  The index, which is constructed from results of a survey that focuses on 
the complexity of litigation on the collection of bounced cheques and the eviction 
of non-paying tenants, ranges from 0 to 7 with a higher value indicating a more 
regulated dispute.  Table 7 presents the regulation of dispute resolution index for 
ASEAN+3 countries.
Countries with laws originating from French legal system have the highest 
index, which indicates that their dispute resolutions are more heavily regulated 
leading to higher expected duration of the dispute.  On the other hand, countries 
with legal systems originating from the Common law have the lowest index values. 
This is intended as an illustrative example rather than a conclusive one.  Overall, 
it is important to note that there are differences in the legal systems in ASEAN+3 
that may act as an obstacle to the integration process of financial markets.
Tax System
The structure of the corporate income tax system and tax incentives offered by the 
host country can influence the inflow of foreign direct investments and portfolio 
investments.  If expected rates of return from different locations are similar, a lower 
corporate tax rate could determine the final investment location decision.  Therefore, 
most countries regularly review their tax policies to keep them competitive and 
attractive to foreign investments.  The same applies to ASEAN+3.  In order to 
attract the inflow of investments, these countries compete to have more attractive 
tax policy which results in the differences in their tax systems.
Different tax legislation can be one of the major obstacles to regional financial 
integration.  Firms from countries with low corporate income tax rate would not 
be very keen to invest in countries that have a higher rate of corporate tax, but 
prefer to invest in countries with lower corporate income tax rate or maintain their 
investment domestically to retain their profit margin.  Clearly, an increase in tax 
rate on multinational firms reduces inward foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000). 
Thus, a region with relatively higher dissimilarity taxation system is not very likely 
to have well balanced capital mobility, which consequently lowers the possibility 
of regional financial market integration.
Table 8 reports the main features of the corporate tax systems in selected 
ASEAN+3 countries, revealing the differences in the region’s tax systems.  For 
example, the corporate income taxation is low in South Korea at 27 percent followed 
by Malaysia at 28 percent while it is high at 33 percent in China.  These differences 
can be a barrier to further promote financial integration in the region.  Although 
foreign direct investment is rising in China despite its high corporate tax rate, this 
is mostly due to relatively lower labour and operational cost.
198
International Journal of Economics and Management
Table 8 Main features of corporate tax systems in selected ASEAN+3 
countries
China Malaysia Thailand Japan Korea
Standard  
CIT* rate
33%  
(state tax of 30% 
and local tax of 
3%)
28% 30% 30% 27%
Inter-company 
dividends 
Fully/partially 
excluded
Included as part 
of the taxable 
income
Fully/partially 
excluded
Fully/partially 
excluded
Fully/partially 
excluded
Dividend 
withholding 
taxes
20% Included as part 
of the taxable 
income
10% Partially 
included as a 
part of taxable 
income for PIT 
or 20%
Included as part 
of the taxable 
income
Capital gains CIT rate CIT rate CIT rate CIT rate 
Surtax of 5% 
on gains from 
land or similar 
properties
CIT rate
Treatment of 
losses
5 years carried 
forward
Carried  
forward
Indefinitely
5 years carried 
forward
5 years carried 
forward:
1 year carried 
back
5 years carried 
forward
Note: CIT refer to Corporate Income Taxation.
Source: D’Amuri and Marenzi (2005)
Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is believed to impact upon the behaviour and performance 
of corporations and its role is seen as increasingly important in shaping the 
process of integration in the EU.  Investors are more interested in investing in a 
country with credible and well understood corporate governance systems.  Well-
functioning corporate governance systems improve investors’ confidence, reduce 
cost of capital, and induce more stable sources of financing (Adam et al., 2002). 
In a closely interconnected global economy, investors are ever more demanding 
and discriminating.  In order to promote the development of deep and liquid, and 
hence more stable financial markets and create a favourable investment climate, a 
country should create conducive corporate governance mechanisms.  Transparent 
corporate governance is currently seen as a prerequisite for countries wanting to 
exploit all the benefits of the global capital market and promote increased integration 
(Adam et al., 2002).
This study defines corporate governance as mechanisms that minimize agency 
conflicts involving managers, with particular emphasis on the legal mechanisms 
that prevent the expropriation of minority share holders (see Shleifer and Vishny, 
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1997).  A detailed examination of insider ownership in some emerging markets 
by La Porta et al. (1998) suggests that the lack of good governance becomes 
important when growth prospects deteriorate.  The absence of effective shareholder 
protection can cause a large drop in economic growth when even a mild shock 
exists.  In ASEAN+3, some jurisdictions already employ standards and practices 
in line with the international norm.  However, other countries in the region require 
full compliance and changes to the national, legal and regulatory framework to 
improve their corporate governance mechanisms.
We utilize the corporate governance indices by La Porta et al. (1998) and 
argue that this contributes to the low financial market integration in ASEAN+3. 
Indices are from four aspects of corporate governance namely enforceable minority 
shareholder rights, anti-director rights, creditor rights and accounting standard, 
are constructed for each ASEAN+3 country.  Except for accounting standards, 
the indices for some regional countries are above world average while the rest are 
below.  Overall, the corporate governance indices in ASEAN+3 as presented by 
Table 9 provide mixed results.
Table 9 Corporate Governance Indices in ASEAN+3
Enforceable minority 
shareholder rights
Anti directors 
right
Creditor 
rights
Accounting 
standards, 1990
China n.a n.a n.a n.a
Indonesia 1.0 2 4 n.a
Japan n.a 4 2 65
Korea 1.0 2 3 62
Malaysia 2.0 4 4 76
Philippines 3.0 3 0 65
Singapore 4.0 4 4 78
Thailand 2.0 2 3 64
World Average n.a 3 2.3 60.93
Source: La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1998).
Among ASEAN+3 countries, Singapore has the highest indices in all areas. 
Singapore’s indices are also higher than the world average.  For other countries, 
at least one of their indices is below the world average.  For example, the index 
for anti-director rights in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand are 2, below the world 
average of 3.  Japan and the Philippines, on the other hand, score 2 and 0 for creditor 
rights index, respectively, below the 2.3 world average.  For enforceable minority 
shareholder rights, Indonesia and Korea have a very low index of 1.0, compare to 
the maximum score of 4.0.
The corporate government indices reveal large variations in the level of regional 
corporate governance that reflect the lack of adequate disclosure standard.  This 
may seriously undermine the ability of investors to compete for globally mobile 
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capital.  This may impose unnecessary uncertainty to investors operating in the 
Single Market and, thus, constitute an obstacle to the integrated ASEAN+3 financial 
markets.  According to a report by the European Corporate Governance Network 
in 1997, international fund managers do not approve obscurity.  Therefore, they 
will demand high risk premiums when disclosure standards are low and they do 
not invest at all when the disclosure standards are very low.
Corruption
Another aspect that could have negative influence on financial integration is 
corruption.  According to Mauro (1995), corruption can have many detrimental 
effects on the host countries.  In the economic sphere, corruption may reduce growth 
that is possibly due to reduced domestic investment.  In political-economy terms, 
corruption often contributes to an unfair income or wealth distribution, and can 
breed political instability.  It is argued that an increase in the countries’ level of 
corruption level may reduce inward foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000).
Table 10 presents transparency international’s 2001 corruptions perception 
index (CPI) on ASEAN+3 countries.  Perceived corruption in ASEAN+3 is 
measured to vary from very clean (Singapore, with a score of 9.2 out of 10), to very 
corrupt (Indonesia, at 1.9).  All the countries, except Singapore and Japan, have 
CPI score at or below 5.  Compared to 1997, none of the countries achieved a full 
one index point improvement in 2001.  None of the countries, (except Singapore) 
improved their world ranking since 1997 though some countries namely China, 
Japan and Thailand, show some improvement in the index score.
Table 10 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
2001 World Rank* 1997** World Rank**
China 3.5 57 2.9 41
Indonesia 1.9 88 2.7 46
Japan 7.1 21 6.6 21
Korea 4.2 42 4.3 34
Malaysia 5 36 5 32
Philippines 2.9 65 3.1 40
Singapore 9.2 4 8.7 9
Thailand 3.2 61 3.1 39
Source: Asia Pacific Bulletin #14. Website: http://www.asiapacific/ca/apbn/bulletin.cfm.
The index suggests that perceived corruption level varies among ASEAN+3 
countries.  In general, countries can be grouped into three groups based on the 
level of CPI.  High CPI group consists of Singapore and Japan, average CPI group 
consists of Malaysia and Korea, and low CPI group consists of China, Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Thailand.  As corruption can be costly, investors are less keen 
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to invest in countries that have relatively lower CPI index, all other conditions 
remain similar.  In this case, regional investors will prefer to invest in countries 
that have better CPI such as in developed countries like the Western Europe or the 
US.  This may contribute to the stronger ties between several East Asian countries 
and the developed countries than those among the East Asian countries (Park & 
Bae, 2002).
CONCLUSION
This study measures the progress of financial market integration in ASEAN+3 using 
credit market and stock market as indicators.  The results of the Gregory and Hansen 
(1996) cointegration test indicates that both the region’s credit markets and stock 
markets are partially integrated which suggests that regional financial integration 
exists in ASEAN+3 but the level is considerably low.  There is no clear sign that 
the 1997 financial crisis had a positive influence on the region’s financial market 
integration whcih may imply that the measures that have been implemented and 
planned by ASEAN+3 have yet been successful to improve the region’s economic 
integration.
Several factors are likely to have contributed to low ASEAN+3’s financial 
market integration.  Those are the early stages of regional financial market 
integration in ASEAN+3 where individual countries still maintain domestic controls 
and restrictions that hinder integration, the weakly institutionalized process of 
integration in ASEAN+3 without an alliance of key nations or a hegemonic power 
as in Europe and Western Hemisphere, and, the small size of financial institutions 
in the region that have inadequate systems and administration structures to manage 
a huge amount of investment from foreign investors.
Differences in the legal and institutional framework in the region are argued 
to be another factor for the low degree of ASEAN+3’s regional financial market 
integration.  The legal systems in ASEAN+3 originated from four different legal 
systems that have markedly different levels of efficiency.  Efficient judicial system 
facilitates financial market integration by lowering enforcement cost, which in 
turn lead to the availability and the terms of funding to firms and households.  The 
differences in the region’s tax systems, the relatively inferior corporate governance 
systems in some of the countries and the considerably high perceived corruption 
levels in many of the countries have clear adverse consequences for the region’s 
financial market integration.
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